Konštruktivizmus a Autopoiesis

2022-12-12 Referencia Sense-making through everyday language

Konštruktivizmus a Autopoiesis

 ABSTRAKT ZO ZDROJA 1 (Proulx)

1 Biologické korene kognície

Pre Konštruktivizmus je učenie sa aktívnym konštruovaním intersubjektívnej kognitívnej schémy, čiže chápe učenie sa ako špecificky ľudskú aktivitu.

Pre Autopoiesis je učenie sa štrukturálnym spájaním, koadaptáciou učiaceho sa a prostredia, čiže aj učiaci sa, aj prostredie sa, koevolučne menia svoju štruktúru, ktorej zmenu (structural coupling) spúšťajú obojsmerne. Maturana/Varela nazvali tento proces štrukturálny determinizmus. Chápu teda učenie širšie ako ľudské učenie sa a v tomto zmysle je kognitívne všetko živé, čiže aj všetky zvieratá, rastliny, baktérie, atď. Organizmus svojou vlastnou biologickou štruktúrou koadaptuje prostredie.

2 Fylogenetická a ontogenetická báza kognície

Konštruktivizmus teoretizuje ontogenézu jednotlivca. Autopoiesis teoretizuje ontogenézu jednotlivca ako funkciu fylogenézy jeho druhu.

3 Povaha externej reality a poznania

Pre Konštruktivizmus externá realita existuje a dá sa zisťovať iba konštruovaním subjektívnej a intersubjektívnej kognitívnej schémy.

Pre Autopoiesis externá realita a kognícia (v jej širšom koevolučnom, koadaptačnom a druhovom (fylogenetickom zmysle) sú recipročnými a simultánnymi špecifikáciami, kodefiníciami. Subjektivita, intersubjektivita,  ani objektivita svet nevytvárajú. Nastáva ich interakciou ako interobjektivita.

NUTSHELL

1 I need a physical world to make sense of it,

and

2 I need a structure to perceive that physical world, which allows the physical world to be perceived by myself.

3 Without a physical world or a subjective knower, there is no meaning that can emerge.

4 The world of meaning is not in us, nor in the physical  world, it is in the interaction of both in a mutually affective relationship.

RESUME With my structure I make sense and give meaning to that physical world and bring forth a world of significance.  It is a world of significance that is enabled by my structure, and also by the environment that I interact with. It is my structure that allows me to “see” or perceive things in the
physical world, and so my structure allows me to give meaning to the attributes of the physical world. I – my structure – allows the physical world to be brought forth. If these attributes of the physical world are outside of my
structure, outside of my capacity to make sense of them, I cannot distinguish them and cannot perceive them. In other words, they cannot “trigger” anything in me. Hence, I bring forth the physical world’s attributes when I give/create meaning to it – I acknowledge their physical “presence” by bringing them forth. If I do not bring  them forth, the physical world’s attributes will still be “there,” but they will remain unnoticed, not made sense of and kept “in the dark.” It is in this sense that the physical attributes themselves are brought forth by my interaction with them (if I perceive them).

CONNECTION TO HUSSERLIAN (MERLEAU-PONTY) PHENOMENOLOGY

This is in line with the work on perception of Merleau-Ponty (1962; Matthews 2002). For Merleau-Ponty, perception is an active participation, an engagement in the world, and not a separation from it. For him, we are not looking at the world from a vantage point and objectively representing that world, neither are we only subjective perceivers – we inhabit that physical world and it is by our participation in it that we bring forth this world of meanings. To have “being-in-the-world” in this sense is neither to be a mere object, passively suffering the influence of other objects, nor to be in the God-like situation of creating the world from a position that transcends it; it is to be part of a two-way interaction between ourselves and the rest of the world out of which a meaningful structure to the world emerges. (Matthews 2002, p. 54)

ZDROJE

1 Proulx, Some Differences between Maturana and Varela’s Theory of Cognition and Constructivism  (2008)

2 Maturana, Varela, Autopoiesis (1974)

3 Maturana, Varela, Autopoiesis and cognition (1972)

4 Harré, Gillet Discursive mind (1994) – kniha nie je free, toto je interview s Romom Harré… bola preložená do slovenčiny ako Diskurz a myseľ.

5 Matthews (2005) – Mind

6 Merleau-Ponty (1962) – Phenomenology of perception

7 Eric Matthews (2002) – The philosophy of Merleau-Ponty

… pokračovanie

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